The Demetrian Temple wrote a long theological essay on the poverty of Monotheism. They examine Monotheism focusing its structural problems. They conclude that Polytheism offers a better sense of reality.
The essay opens with:
“The deepest limitation of monotheism is not moral, historical, or psychological, but structural. Its defining metaphysical commitment is that ultimate divine reality consists of one irreducible personal subject. My contention is that this commitment, far from maximizing the richness of the divine, inadvertently diminishes it. If reality is as abundant, differentiated, and inexhaustible as experience suggests, then it is worth asking whether the divine source of that reality can plausibly be conceived as numerically singular.
The issue is not whether a single God can possess infinitely many attributes. Classical monotheism has never lacked predicates. God is described as omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good, eternal, beautiful, wise, loving, and just; indeed, one could continue extending this list indefinitely. The crucial question is different: can an infinity of attributes substitute for an infinity of centers of subjectivity? I contend that it cannot.”
The introduction ends with: “This essay is not primarily an argument for the existence of many gods. Rather, it explores the philosophical consequences of taking the possibility of plural divinity seriously. It asks whether a plurality of irreducible divine persons offers a richer and more adequate metaphysical picture than the hypothesis of a solitary divine subject.”
The next section is “II. Polytheology: Beyond the Mere Belief in Many Gods.”
The Demetrian Temple defines Polytheology as the following:
“By polytheism I mean the religious or metaphysical claim that many gods exist. Polytheism is a doctrine concerning the number of divine beings.
By polytheology, however, I mean something much broader and philosophically more ambitious. Polytheology is the disciplined study of the conceptual implications of plural divinity. It asks what follows if divine reality is intrinsically manifold rather than numerically singular. It investigates the metaphysical, epistemological, ethical, aesthetic, phenomenological, and even political consequences of conceiving ultimate reality as a plurality of irreducible divine persons.”
The following sections continue the thesis.
III. Boston Personalism and the Primacy of Persons
They claim that Polytheology extends the philosophy of Boston Personalism.
This philosophy is described in the following: “Borden Parker Bowne (1847 – 1910) and the Boston Personalists argued that reality is fundamentally personal rather than impersonal. Persons are not accidental products of blind forces but the deepest category of metaphysical explanation. Agency, experience, freedom, and mutual recognition possess greater explanatory power than matter conceived as inert substance or mind conceived as abstract reason.”
IV. Divine Abundance
“Polytheology therefore conceives divine reality less as a monarchy than as an ecology.”
V. The Ineffable Remainder
Monotheism preserves diversity only at the level of predicates.
Polytheology preserves diversity at the level of persons.
VI. Properties and Persons
“Here lies the fundamental contrast with classical monotheism.
Monotheism may affirm infinitely many divine predicates.
Polytheology affirms infinitely deep and perhaps even infinitely many divine persons.”
VII. Monotheism’s Structural Limitation
“It allows only one irreducible divine subject.”
VIII. Unity Without Reduction
“Polytheology does not deny unity.
It rejects only the assumption that unity must mean numerical singularity.”
IX. Against Function Reduction
“Polytheology therefore refuses to identify gods with domains, myths, symbols, or functions.
These are genuine disclosures of divine agency.”
X. Replies to Classical Monotheism
The Demetrian Temple presents many arguments with focus on divine simplicity, Ockham’s Razor, and divine perfection.
XI. Conclusion: From Theology to Polytheology
A part of the conclusion is as follows:
“The poverty of monotheism, therefore, is not a poverty of attributes.”
“It is a poverty of persons.
It allows only one irreducible divine “I.”
Polytheology proposes a more expansive vision.
Reality at its deepest is not merely personal.
It is transpersonally plural.”
The concluding paragraph is
“And if that is true, then the future of philosophical theology may not lie in defending the numerical singularity of God, but in recovering a vision of divine reality spacious enough to encompass an inexhaustible plurality of divine persons, united not by identity but by the deeper harmony of irreducible difference. Such, at least, is the invitation that polytheology extends.”
The essay is worth reading in its entirety and pondered further.